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Abstract: A key aspect of competition in industrial maintenance is the trade-off between cost 
and risk. Decision making is dependent upon up-to-date information about distributed and 
disparate plant, coupled with knowledge of sensitive non-technical issues. Enabling technologies 
such as the internet are making strides in improving the quantity and quality of data, particularly 
by improving links with other information systems. In maintenance, the problem of disparate 
data sources is important. It is very difficult to make optimal decisions because the information is 
not easily obtained and merged. Information about technical state or machine health, cost of 
maintenance activities or loss of production, and non-technical risk factors such as customer 
information, is required. Even in the best information systems, these are not defined in the same 
units, and are not presented on a consistent time scale; typically, they are in different information 
systems. Some data is continuously updated, e.g. condition data, but the critical risk information 
is typically drawn from a historical survey, fixed in time.  
A particular problem for the users of condition based maintenance is the treatment of alarms. In 
principle, only genuine problems are reported, but the technical risk of failure is not the full 
story. The decision-maker will take into account cost, criticality and other factors, such as 
limited resources, to prioritise the work. The work reported here automatically prioritises jobs 
arising from condition based maintenance using a strategy called Cost-Based Criticality (CBC) 
which draws together three types of information. CBC weights each incident flagged by 
condition monitoring alarms with up-to-date cost information and risk factors, allowing an 
optimised prioritisation of maintenance activities. CBC does not attempt to change the strategic 
plan for maintenance activities: it only addresses prioritisation. The strategy uses a thin-client 
architecture rather than a central database, and is illustrated with examples from food 
manufacturing. 
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1  Introduction 
To succeed in the competitive global 
marketplace of today, it is vital for an 
organisation to optimise its operational 
costs. The cost of maintaining complex 
industrial systems is one of the critical 
factors influencing the enterprise operating 
costs and it is estimated that 18-30% of this 
is wasted [1,2]. Hence, the importance of 
optimising the maintenance function is 
obvious. 
Inadequate maintenance can result in higher 
levels of unplanned asset failure, which has 
many inherent costs to the organisation 
including:  
 lost production; 
 rework; 
 scrap; 
 labour;  
 spare parts; 
 fines for late orders; 
 lost orders due to unsatisfied 
customers. 
The nature of maintenance planning is 
changing rapidly with the uptake of 
condition based maintenance, integration 
and e-maintenance. 
 
1.1 Condition based maintenance 
Condition based maintenance aims to reduce 
the number of unplanned asset failures by 
monitoring equipment condition to predict 
failures enabling remedial actions to be 
taken. It includes, but is not limited to, 
technologies such as:  
 vibration analysis;  
 infrared thermography;  
 oil analysis and tribology;  
 ultrasonics;  
 motor current analysis;  
 performance monitoring; 
 visual inspection. 
Many Computerised Maintenance 
Management Systems (CMMS) use 
condition monitoring alarm levels to trigger 
maintenance activities. Incoming condition-
based data for assets is compared to 
predefined thresholds and when the 
threshold is exceeded an alarm is raised to 
highlight the event. The quantity of 
condition monitoring activity, coupled with 
limitations in setting alarm levels, has led to 
a problem for maintenance personnel coping 
with the quantity of alarms on a daily basis. 
The human decision-maker must assume 
that the alarms are true until it is proved 
otherwise. Determining which of the alarms 
to tackle first can be a difficult and time 
consuming procedure and is usually reliant 
on the experience of the operator.  
1.2 Integration of criticality 
Criticality assessments are procedures which 
aim to identify those assets that could have 
the greatest effect on an operation if they 
were to fail. When deciding on which 
maintenance strategies to adopt, 
organisations usually carry out some form of 
criticality assessment based on collected 
data or the experience of personnel. 
However, once a strategy has been adopted 
it is unlikely that the results of the analysis 
will be used to prioritise activities on a daily 
basis. Most criticality assessments are only 
readily available on paper. 
Resource for repair and replacement arising 
from an alarm is limited. Focus of resource 
requires accurate information to prioritise 
maintenance activities and hence optimise 
return on investment. Forward thinking plant 
executives, maintenance managers and work 
planners have always wanted to have 
information about the condition of 
equipment assets at their fingertips when 
they need it. Unfortunately, this information 
is usually scattered among separate 
information systems making it difficult or 
impossible to view on one computer 
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terminal and use as a basis for sound asset 
management decisions [3].  
Integration in information systems provides 
a potential solution to the problem of 
isolated data sources. Decision making is 
often achieved with uncertainty and 
unknowns, while measuring against 
conflicting performance criteria. 
Maintenance decisions are made in the 
context of business priorities. Integration 
must facilitate the bi-directional flow of data 
and information into the decision-making 
and planning process at all levels. This 
reaches from business systems right down to 
sensor level. Integrated systems should 
automate the retrieval of information that 
decision makers require to make sound 
judgements. Essentially it should be a means 
of establishing links between data sources 
and close the loop from the minutiae of data 
to collection to strategic decision making 
[4]. 
1.3 e-Maintenance 
e-Maintenance brings benefits to a 
distributed organisation, that is where plant, 
people, expertise or data are physically 
separate or isolated. Baldwin defines e-
maintenance as an “asset information 
management network that integrates and 
synchronises the various maintenance and 
reliability applications to gather and deliver 
asset information where it is needed when it 
is needed” [3]. A more general definition is 
that e-maintenance is a “maintenance 
management concept whereby assets are 
monitored and managed over the Internet” 
[5].  
The e-maintenance infrastructure is 
considered to be made up of several 
information sectors. These are: 
 control systems and production 
schedulers; 
 engineering product data 
management systems; 
 enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
systems; 
 condition monitoring systems; 
 maintenance scheduling (CMMS/ 
EAM) systems; 
 plant asset management (PAM) 
systems. [3]  
1.4 Aims and objectives 
This paper will illustrate the problems 
experienced by a human decision-maker 
trying to cope with  condition monitoring 
alarms. The aim of the work is to create a 
method to focus attention automatically on 
alarms that pose the gravest consequences to 
the business. The methods and functionality 
of criticality assessments will be reviewed. 
The nature of distributed data will be 
considered and the benefits arising from e-
maintenance will be explored.  
On-line criticality is an important input to 
the process. Typical criticality analyses 
(FMECA etc) have been done, but remain 
on paper. The model of the layout of the 
plant varies with the product in the case 
study company. In this work the criticality 
model will be live and the choice of product 
affects the numbers used for criticality as an 
input to CBC. The main purpose of the CBC 
algorithm is to rank all the alarms arising 
from condition monitoring. We observe that 
the alarms can be trusted in mature 
applications but that they are not all equally 
important and we do not have the resources 
to do all the jobs. 
The objectives of the paper are: 
 to review and understand the 
limitations of disparate and 
fragmented data in the decision-
making process; 
 review the key features of methods 
for integration and fusion in 
maintenance decision data; 
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 to illustrate an automated algorithm 
for dynamically merging 
maintenance data streams;  
 to demonstrate effectiveness by 
implementing the algorithm on 
industrial data. 
2  Prioritising Maintenance 
Activities  
2.1 Condition-Based Alarms 
The prioritisation of maintenance activities 
has become increasingly difficult due to the 
complexity of modern organisational 
facilities and advancements in condition 
monitoring techniques. The automation of 
data collection, processing and analysis has 
increased the quantity of information 
available without necessarily improving its 
quality. At the same time, the availability of 
skilled personnel is tightened as businesses 
strive to become more competitive.  
Computerised Maintenance Management 
Systems (CMMS) have made extensive use 
of condition-based data for their scheduling 
of maintenance actions. The state of health 
of a machine or process is estimated by 
analysis of measured parameters. Typically, 
the parameter is compared to a predefined 
threshold, and the CMMS automatically 
compares incoming data to a look-up table 
of alarm levels. If a threshold is broken then 
an alarm is raised to highlight the event and 
trigger actions to resolve the issue. 
However, this approach has a number of 
drawbacks: 
 the initial setting has no historical 
data, so a heuristic approach may be 
used -  this relies on the expertise to 
interpret standards or to draw on 
experience of similar machines; 
 there is no adaptation to running 
conditions, e.g. load or speed; 
 manual review is laborious and is 
often not done [6]. 
This simplistic approach to alarm setting 
results in many false alarms being 
generated, which further complicates the 
task of scheduling maintenance activities. 
Attention must be focused on those alarms 
that may have the gravest effect on the 
profitability of the organisation.  
To determine this, the maintenance manager 
must be able to balance the cost of 
performing maintenance activities against 
the cost of not performing them. Performing 
this task effectively and consistently 
involves the consideration of many factors 
and an in-depth knowledge of the business. 
In reality, it is almost impossible due to the 
number of factors that require consideration 
and the number of assets that it must be 
applied to. It has been proved that “an 
individual cannot compare simultaneously 
more than seven objects (plus or minus two) 
without becoming more and more 
inconsistent” [7]. 
A real dilemma is the dependence of a 
process, and essentially an organisation, on 
an individual‟s expert knowledge of a plant: 
what happens if they are sick, or worse, 
leave? This would suggest that a more 
appropriate, systematic and adaptive process 
is required to effectively prioritise 
maintenance activities.  
2.2 Criticality Analysis 
There are numerous methods currently 
available to maintenance managers to assist 
them in targeting those assets that are most 
critical to the department. One of the most 
popular and widely used methods is „Failure 
Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis‟. 
FMECA is a bottom-up approach that ranks 
assets in order of priority by determining the 
consequences, probabilities, and in some 
cases, the likelihood of detecting asset 
failures.  
There is no standard method of attributing a 
value to each of these factors and many 
organisations have developed their own 
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bespoke classification tables such as Table 1 
[8]. Others assign a value between one and 
ten to each factor and multiply these 
together to obtain a „Risk Priority Number‟ 
(RPN) which is used to rank the assets.  
The significance of these classifications or 
RPN numbers is questionable due to the 
subjective nature of their generation. The 
values assigned to each weighting factor are 
drawn from a table that crudely attempts to 
convert qualitative data into quantitative 
data using the experience of personnel or 
with the assistance of an external consultant. 
This approach can be very valuable to a 
maintenance function but it has many 
weaknesses as identified below.  
a. Dependant on personnel expertise – 
may need to outsource. 
b. Time consuming. 
c. Can be expensive. 
d. Only relevant at that particular point 
in time. 
e. No transferable metric provided – 
hard to communicate importance to 
other departments. 
f. Not indicative of importance of the 
asset in meeting the organisational 
objectives. 
The last weakness is very significant as we 
are told that “at the shop-floor level, the 
maintenance processes which mainly focus 
on repairing and breakdown services, are 
sometimes started in a non co-ordinated 
way, even in contradiction to business 
objectives, and without a real estimate of 
different effectiveness factors other than the 
availability impact” [1].  
In addition, providing a transferable metric 
is more important now than ever before, as 
Iung states “the objective today is to 
industrially implement and evaluate a 
collaborative maintenance with the 
possibility to demonstrate in site its added 
value” [9].  
Traditionally, methods of criticality analysis 
have been used to determine the 
maintenance strategy to adopt for an asset. 
Once this strategy has been commissioned it 
is unlikely that the results of the analysis 
will be used to assist in the prioritisation of 
maintenance activities on a day-to-day basis. 
An inherent problem of criticality 
assessments is that they are static procedures 
that don‟t update as the operating 
environment alters. The criticality of an 
asset will inevitably vary with time as it 
depends on a multitude of factors.  
In an ongoing case study at a food 
processing facility it has been identified that 
the criticality of certain sections of the 
production line varies greatly depending on 
the production schedule. This is due to 
different products requiring different 
equipment sections for their production. 
Therefore when a section of equipment is 
not required, it is not critical. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1.  
When there are two or more products being 
produced at the same time or there are two 
or more lines to maintain, criticality will 
also vary. For example, if there are two 
identical machines on two identical lines 
producing two similar products, it may be 
fair to assume that both machines have the 
same criticality. However, if one machine is 
producing a more profitable product then it 
is more critical than the other as the 
consequences to the organisation are greater 
in the event of a failure (assuming all other 
variables are equal).  
Current methods have no facility to deal 
with this and over time the assigned 
criticality will become inaccurate.  
To fully utilise the time, effort and expense 
required to carryout a criticality analysis, the 
analysis needs to be ongoing and used not 
just to determine strategies but to assist in 
prioritising activities on a day-to-day basis.  
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2.3 Review of models which integrate 
condition and criticality 
There is a great deal of literature which 
concentrates on modelling for fault 
diagnosis and location, but there is less 
which deals with decision making in 
maintenance management. 
Jardine‟s method uses a Markov chain to 
represent the behaviour of a physical 
system, and combines a number of condition 
indicators, coupled with failure cost data and 
life expectancy. The factors are combined in 
the proportional hazard model. The future 
evolution of a Markov system is only 
dependent upon the present condition, unlike 
a regression method which predicts a 
dependent variable based upon the history of 
several independent variables. The method 
is marketed as the EXAKT
TM
 system, in 
which the risk factors are combined with the 
failure history and costs of both planned 
maintenance and unpredicted failures, to 
obtain the optimal replacement interval for a 
group of machines. The technique does not 
deal with the prioritisation of a range of 
potential actions. [10] 
Sherwin described the application of 
Weibull analysis to extensive failure data to 
effect decision-making on maintenance in 
the process industries. The technique is 
appropriate for determination of the failure 
regime, and hence to modify maintenance 
policy. It is however somewhat reliant on 
having sufficient failure data to analyse, and 
does not attempt to prioritise individual 
events. [11] 
Al-Najjar assessed maintenance strategies 
using a fuzzy multiple criteria decision 
making (MCDM) evaluation methodology, 
and showed how the most informative or 
efficient maintenance approach would lead 
to less planned replacements, reduced 
failures higher utilization of component life. 
The relationship with business objectives 
was discussed, but the emphasis was on 
strategy rather than individual events. [12] 
Wang applied a stochastic recursive control 
model to condition based maintenance. 
Actions to be taken, and optimal condition 
monitoring intervals, were considered as 
different decisions. A stochastic recursive 
filtering model predicted residual life, and 
then a decision model recommended actions. 
[13] 
Al-Najjar & Wang noted the paucity of the 
literature in the field and presented a unified 
conceptual approach with the problems in 
the paper manufacturing sector in mind. The 
model integrates condition information, 
deterministic models used in condition 
monitoring, and probabilistic models used in 
operational research. The working of the 
model is extensively discussed in the context 
of a rolling element bearing. The model does 
not consider the problem of multiple alarm 
events. [14] 
Al-Najjar proposed an all-encompassing 
approach called Total Quality Maintenance, 
which combines the areas of production and 
maintenance to maximise competitiveness, 
and central to which is a common database. 
The concept recognised the problems that 
we have tried to tackle in this work, and 
hence there is certainly scope in the concept 
for ranking of potential CBM failures, but it 
is not explicitly described. It was 
acknowledged that plenty of real data would 
be required for testing. [15] 
Hence, the majority of work reported in the 
literature has concentrated on residual life, 
replacement decision, and strategic choice, 
and the traditional statistical approach has 
moved towards a more philosophical and 
pragmatic one with hybrid mathematical 
methods, but practical aspects of the 
solutions remain a challenge because of lack 
of data from real integrated systems. 
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3  Data Fusion architecture 
3.1  Integrating Information Systems 
It has been estimated that the penetration of 
condition monitoring (CM) is only 10-20 per 
cent of its potential. This represents a loss of 
up to £1.6 billion in the UK alone [16]. A 
limiting factor is the existing level of 
systems integration. Starr and Ball [4] 
suggest that this can be addressed by the 
holistic approach and the adoption of new 
technology, including: 
a. open global electronic information 
systems; 
b. adaptive shared communications 
media; 
c. smart sensors; 
d. adaptive flexible decision-making 
algorithms. 
Integration theory combines the application 
of holistics and global performance criteria. 
The concept of asset management optimises 
labour, tools, equipment, materials, and 
information by integrating financial, human 
resources, and purchasing functions, as well 
as production, materials requirements 
planning, and enterprise resources planning 
systems [17]. The integration of 
computerised maintenance management 
systems (CMMS) with enterprise asset 
management (EAM) systems can simplify 
this process.  
Ultimately, all decisions should be made 
inline with the business objectives and drive 
the business forward. This requires a 
comprehensive view of the internal systems 
of the organisation.  
3.2 Isolated Islands of Data 
Decision makers within organisations 
regularly face the same problem; how do 
they get the information they need to make 
the most effective decision? To identify 
what information a maintenance manager 
will require when making decisions on a 
daily basis we must first consider his overall 
objective. A common definition of the 
objective of a maintenance department is to 
“achieve the agreed plant operating pattern, 
product output and quality, within the 
accepted plant condition and safety 
standards, and at minimum resource 
cost”[18]. So with this objective in mind; 
what information will he require? In order to 
make sound judgements a maintenance 
manager will typically need to know to the 
following: 
 production schedule;  
 equipment requirements;  
 equipment condition; 
 required quality level;  
 required safety & environment 
legislation; 
 available resources; 
 priority of tasks. 
This information is available from the 
following sources [19]: 
 production schedules; 
 condition monitoring systems; 
 maintenance management systems; 
 financial records; 
 health & safety regulations. 
The realistic level of access to data from 
these sources today is, at best, a search 
across servers to find the correct spreadsheet 
or database, and at worst, it involves visiting 
each of the appropriate people to retrieve 
paper copies of the information. This can be 
a very time consuming task. When decisions 
must be made quickly, management may be 
forced to go on „gut-feeling‟ This seems 
ridiculous at a time when the media would 
have us believe we are living in the 
“information age”. The reality of the matter 
is somewhat different. Paper reports exist 
and are not all read. This casts doubt on the 
effective deployment of resources. 
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3.3 Centralising Data 
It has been suggested that the way forward 
for the storage of data required by 
maintenance managers is to create a 
centralised database to house the relevant 
data from each information system [15,20]. 
This sounds a suitable solution but is laden 
with difficulties. Many of the information 
systems that can be found in organisations 
have been acquired by departments over 
periods of time and normally without 
consultation with other departments. Many 
of the systems are not compatible with each 
other and that data is stored in formats that 
prevents it from being brought together 
easily in a centralised database. 
Large databases can have many drawbacks; 
they can become unwieldy and require 
complex hardware and software to operate 
effectively. Setup costs can be very high and 
due to the complexities of the system, 
operational and maintenance costs can 
escalate to many times the original outlay. In 
addition, if the system suffers a failure then 
many subsystems are affected instead of 
one. Making backups of large centralised 
databases can be both time consuming and 
expensive.  
3.4 Remote Data Access 
The physical location of a database is no 
longer important. Indeed, private networks 
and the internet routinely service fast, 
remote data requests. Furthermore, it is not 
necessary for all data entities to be in the 
same electronic table or even the same 
relational database. Particularly where 
several systems are managed separately, 
largely for separate purposes, it would be 
unwise to combine them. The key advance is 
top-level information gained by dynamic 
linking. Such information is current and 
“real-time” – decisions can be made with 
current, not historical, data. 
An example of linked databases is the 
passing of job information and billing data 
from a facilities management system to a 
maintenance management system (and vice 
versa) at a London Bank [21]. 
The technical task is not difficult – it is 
simply a standardised request for text or 
numbers. The problem lies in the 
formulation of the architecture of the 
integration, and hence knowing what to ask 
for, and where. 
A remote access method, combined with an 
appropriate dynamic algorithm, can bring 
many of the benefits of a centralised 
database but eliminate many of the pitfalls.  
It is preferred that data is requested in 
advance from each proprietary information 
system to an intermediate database, which  
can be queried by the algorithm – this is 
more robust. Data can be passed each time 
there is a change in any of the measured 
parameters or on the request of the 
algorithm. As this data is only required at 
the time of the calculation, no backups are 
required and if the system fails then the 
original systems are still in place.  
Naturally it is possible to avoid the use of an 
intermediate database, but the data transfer 
problem starts to resemble a serial reliability 
problem – there are many potential sources 
of failure. Figure 2 illustrates the simplified 
data retrieval system. 
3.5 Data fusion as an integration 
model 
The data and information sources must be 
combined automatically, quickly and 
iteratively. Maintenance management is not 
unique in searching for methods to automate 
decision-making: the problem occurs in 
medicine, non-destructive testing, robotics, 
condition monitoring and in military 
applications, where extensive theoretical 
work has been laid down. A model for data 
fusion was standardised by the US military 
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Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) and is 
illustrated in figure 3[22]. 
Note that other models exist, but they tend 
to be specific to an application such as 
robotics or machine vision, so we have not 
explored them further here. It is useful to 
consider briefly the “engineering guidelines” 
for applications, which are outlined below: 
identification, estimation and validation 
[23]. 
The model is useful because it considers the 
combination of data and information for 
decision processes at every step from 
measured data to performance appraisal. It 
has been widely applied to condition 
monitoring processes, but is equally 
applicable to information for maintenance 
management.  
At this level the true capability of the model 
becomes apparent – many applications are 
concerned with fusion of measured 
parameters, or model-based methodologies, 
but still only give a numerical estimate of 
health condition. Here we aim to combine 
the health condition with the wider issues of 
cost and risk, because decisions made from 
this information are frequent and crucial. 
Note that the model does not prescribe a set 
algorithm for the fusion process. The model 
aims to get the best combination of data and 
information – it is not dogmatic. Depending 
on the data and information types, the fusion 
might involve a wide range of mathematical 
approaches, but it is likely that the right 
technique will be very simple once the pre-
processing is complete. 
3.5.1 Identification 
This stage makes inferences about the 
system. 
• Identify the information to be gained by 
using data fusion. 
• Understand the phenomenon under 
study. 
• Understand the data sources including 
collection and measuring techniques. 
• Pre-process the data: synchronisation, 
dimensional reduction, concentration, 
repeatability, redundancy. 
• Identify uncertainty and minimise it. 
• Identify the level at which fusion must 
take place – low level for sensors, high 
level for information/decisions. 
3.5.2 Estimation 
This is performed at the appropriate level of 
inference. Two taxonomies are popular to 
select the data fusion algorithm in order to 
deal with a range of data sources, e.g. time 
series and images:  
• a four level hierarchy consisting of 
signal, pixel, feature, and symbol levels; 
• a classical JDL model of data fusion.  
After the core hierarchical architecture has 
been selected according to the type of data 
and application, algorithm selection is made 
at each level. 
3.5.3 Validation 
The processed data and the fused 
information is confirmed at the validation 
stage, where performance assessment and a 
benchmark procedure are implemented: 
• performance assessment, measuring the 
uncertainty content; 
• benchmark procedure to improve the 
output results; 
• feedback and fine tuning. 
 
4 Cost-Based Criticality 
Cost-Based Criticality (CBC) is a new 
methodology being developed to solve many 
of the issues with current criticality 
assessment methods. CBC is intended to 
prioritise maintenance activities when large 
numbers of condition-based alarms are 
raised.  
Similar to other criticality assessments, CBC 
uses the probability of occurrence and 
resulting consequences of an asset failure to 
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rank assets. The differentiating factor is that 
CBC will use cost as the consequence metric 
so that the criticality can be illustrated to 
interested external parties more easily. It 
will also encompass more variables into the 
consequence section of the analysis and 
integrate the requirements of the production 
department because assets which are critical 
today may not be critical for subsequent 
orders. Figure 4 illustrates the Cost-Based 
Criticality process. 
To balance the benefits of each activity with 
the cost of performing it, „Cost-Benefit 
Analysis‟ (CBA) will be used. CBA is a 
well established method where a list of 
burdens and benefits is made and monetary 
values assigned. Then the net cost is 
calculated by subtracting the cost of the 
burdens from the cost rewards of the 
benefits [24].  
Evidently there are some benefits or 
burdens, such as safety or quality, which 
cannot be easily expressed directly in terms 
of monetary values. However, these factors 
can have values estimated which represent 
the minimum amount of money that the 
organisation would accept in their place. 
This value should be determined by 
examining tradeoffs between money and the 
intangible factor [25].  
An example of this trade-off process is 
shown by the UK Department of Transport, 
describing „Road Accidents Great Britain 
1997‟. It states that “It contained an article 
describing the results of recent research on 
the value of prevention of a road accident 
fatality. The research showed that a figure in 
the range £750,000 to £1,250,000 in 1997 
prices could be regarded as being broadly 
acceptable” [26]. This is the most difficult 
element of CBA and is only possible when 
all participants agree with the prices used.   
CBC will operate by drawing existing data 
from isolated islands of data into a criticality 
algorithm so that a CBC value can be 
determined for each asset. This operation 
will be performed each time there is a 
change in the organisation‟s environment 
such as an increase in the price of raw 
materials, change is asset health or the 
production of a different product. The CBC 
values will then be used to rank maintenance 
activities in order of priority at that point in 
time.  
4.1 Fusion algorithms 
The fusion “engine” sits within the 
architecture for collecting and reporting the 
data and information, and is implemented by 
an algorithm for combining those entities. 
There is a wide range of fusion algorithms, 
suitable for different data types and problem 
architectures [27]. For example: 
 where clear rules or heuristics are 
available, knowledge based systems 
or fuzzy logic are appropriate; 
 a robust model is worth using if it 
exists; 
 if no model or rules exist, but there is 
a large quantity of data, then 
numerical techniques like neural 
networks may be trained for pattern 
recognition. 
In practice, many engineers dislike the latter 
example because they prefer the auditable 
decision-making of the former methods. 
Any method used must generate trust in its 
users, or it will be shelved. 
In this instance we have kept the algorithm 
very simple, as shown below. Research in 
progress will test more sophisticated 
algorithms, but this will not be further 
explored here. 
4.2 Probability of Asset Failure 
In order to determine the probability of an 
asset failure, an in-depth analysis of the 
historical reliability data must be carried out 
to determine the reliability and availability 
of each asset. If sufficient data is unavailable 
then appropriate data can be sourced from 
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reliability data suppliers. This will be 
suitably accurate.  However, if the assets 
being assessed are bespoke products with 
little or no similarity to anything else on the 
market, approximations may have to be 
used. 
4.3 Consequences of Asset Failure 
Consequences of failures will be identified 
using a set of criteria. Each criterion will 
have a monetary value assigned to represent 
the potential cost to the organisation. In 
addition, consideration will be given to other 
elements which affect the total downtime 
cost such as set-up times, spare part lead 
times and time taken to find someone to 
repair the fault. 
The first decision to be made for a criticality 
analysis is to decide those criteria on which 
to base the analysis. The method under 
development aims to use criteria, selected 
from a core list, which may be omitted or 
tailored to meet the needs of the individual 
organisation. The core criteria are: 
 Production Loss 
Production loss will be calculated by 
determining the reduction in production rate 
for the asset due to a failure and multiplying 
this by the value that would have been added 
in the process. However, the value added to 
a product by an asset will change in many 
organisations depending on what product is 
being produced at that particular point in 
time. Consequently the system must have 
access to the production schedule to 
determine an accurate figure. 
 Capital Loss 
Capital loss is the sum cost of labour, spare 
parts and any secondary damage that would 
be caused to other assets in the event of a 
failure. 
 Quality Loss 
Quality loss is the estimated cost of a 
reduction in quality, reworking or scrap due 
to an asset not meeting specified tolerance 
levels or any other quality related issues. 
 Safety & Environment 
Safety and environment costs are any fines 
or compensation claims that have been 
incurred as a direct result of an asset failure. 
 Customer Satisfaction 
Customer satisfaction is the cost of lost 
orders or fines due to late orders as a result 
of asset failures.  
These criteria are not exhaustive or 
dogmatic, and could be adapted to suit 
different applications with differing 
sensitivities. 
4.4 CBC Value 
The CBC value is a product of a probability 
and a consequence. Therefore, the output 
from the CBC algorithm will be a 
probability of incurring a cost if a 
maintenance activity is not carried out.  
CBC is calculated as follows: 
 
   CBC = Σ(P, C, Q, SE, CS).Pf   (eq. 1) 
 
Where the estimates of potential cost impact 
are: 
P – production loss; 
C – capital equipment; 
Q – quality; 
SE – safety and environment; 
CS – customer satisfaction; 
and Pf is the probability of failure. Note that 
the CBC calculation is not invoked unless 
the condition monitoring alarm is set. 
As an example, the following numbers for 
an incident are introduced from a food plant: 
P = 1200 (£) 
C = 200 
Q = 100 
SE = 0 
CS = 200 
Pf = 0.05 
Hence CBC = 1700 x 0.05 = £85. 
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4.5 Examples 
4.5.1 Ranking 
Table 2 illustrates a summary table of top 
ranking faults with some simulated data. On 
the right hand side of the table, the final 
column, “CBC value” gives the potential 
impact; its unit is £, but the measure is 
intended to be relative rather than absolute. 
The CBC value implies a combination of 
risk and cost, and hence the highest should 
be actioned first. This number needs no 
further processing by the human decision-
maker: it is a scalar. The list is “live”, such 
that it is revised at a practical frequency, e.g. 
daily.  
When the table is ranked, the human 
decision-maker can select all those tasks for 
which he has the resources to perform. Note 
that the others will remain in alarm, and 
might fail, but we have chosen more critical 
risks first. Low risk alarms remain on the list 
for further consideration at the next ranking. 
Usually this will not lead to catastrophic 
failure, because the condition monitoring 
will give plenty of warning. If the alarm 
does not reach the top of the list before 
failure, it remains relatively low risk. 
4.5.2 Derivation 
Table 3 illustrates how the CBC values are 
calculated using the core criteria. On the left 
of the table, each entry on the list is 
identified by its day, location and current 
product. The consequence criteria are 
extracted from the table simply for clarity of 
layout; they are part of the same database 
table. 
 
4.5.3 Differential CBC values 
Table 3 displays consequential costs for two 
similar machines on two different lines 
producing different products. The 
consequential costs of failures are based on 
one particular failure mode that is common 
to both machines and it is assumed that the 
probability of occurrence is the same in both 
machines. The table illustrates how the CBC 
value changes as the machines switch 
production from one product to another. 
Initially machine 001023 FAM (labelled A) 
is more critical than machine 001024 GME 
(labelled B). As the latter machine changes 
production to product “STK C/C”*, it 
becomes the more critical (labelled C). In 
effect, for the first three days of production 
0010023 FAM would  receive attention first 
if both machines required attention. For the 
latter three days 001024 GME would have 
priority.  
*Note: the codes are not explained further 
because the work is commercially sensitive. 
4.5.4 Schedule change 
Table 4 summarises the differences 
introduced by a change in operating 
schedule on the same machines. As 
indicated in figure 1 different products, or 
even differing quality of similar products, 
can use different modular production 
machinery and give different risks on the 
same machines. The table indicates a 
simulated range of changes caused by 
increases and decreases in the failure 
probability and the consequence cost. The 
importance is not in the exact numbers but 
in the range of potential change from one 
production schedule to the next. 
To underline this effect, Table 5 tracks an 
alarm under different schedule conditions 
from rank order 34 to rank order 55 as its 
CBC value is more than halved. 
5  Discussion 
It is important to examine the results of this 
approach and its added value related to 
conventional approaches. It is difficult to 
quantify the benefit in the initial testing, 
because it would need years of testing in the 
field. We know that the human decision-
Page 13 of 26 
maker can only attempt an approximation to 
an optimal ranking. It is not likely that the 
human decision-maker will respond well to 
common complexities, such as 
combinatorial problems of multiple potential 
jobs, or of rearrangement of modular plant, 
which leads to different criticality ratings 
(most criticality analysis remains paper-
based). We have three options for 
performance assessment. 
i) Wait several years, consistently running 
CBC alongside a human decision-maker; 
perhaps ideal, but this is not likely to be 
successful, because of staff changes, and the 
typical industrial demand for a quick result. 
ii) Simulate scenarios within the data which 
replicate likely change of ranking order, 
which we believe would not usually be 
included automatically, and compare the 
influence of the top jobs selected. It is not 
possible to say whether the human decision-
maker might occasionally also include these 
changes, but our survey work suggests not. 
This option is explored in the results. 
iii) Compare different algorithms for CBC: 
the current algorithm is deliberately very 
simple. More sophisticated algorithms can 
be used to create the ranking, and then the 
top jobs can be compared by simulation as 
in ii) to evaluate any improvement in 
performance. This is work in progress. 
Ideally one would predict a cost benefit or 
improved availability but we cannot do this 
in the short term. This is, however, a typical 
problem in this area of research. 
At present the method of combining the 
probability of failure with the consequential 
cost is simple. However, more complex 
methods are currently being tested as part of 
a further case study at a food processing 
facility.  
6  Conclusions and further work 
 The increase in use of condition 
monitoring techniques combined with 
simplified methods of setting condition-
based maintenance alarms has led to 
maintenance personnel having to deal 
with large numbers of alarms.  
 In an ongoing case study at a food 
processing facility it has been identified 
that the criticality of certain sections of 
the production line varies greatly 
depending on the variables such as the 
production schedule. 
 It has been identified that a criticality 
analysis needs to be continuous and 
determine the criticality of assets on a 
daily basis so that alarms from the 
CMMS can be ranked in order of 
priority.  
 Current criticality analysis techniques 
are unable to deal with this problem as 
they are static procedures used primarily 
to identify initial maintenance strategies.  
 Cost-Based Criticality has been 
introduced as a method to prioritise 
maintenance activities based on the 
ability of the asset in question to affect 
the profitability of the organisation.  
 The process utilises an algorithm which 
eliminates the need for a cumbersome 
centralised database and simplifies 
implementation.  
 Although at present in its infancy and 
using only simplistic methods to 
combine prioritisation factors, initial 
testing has indicated promising results. 
A good performance metric is required 
for scenario analysis. 
 The system architecture requires further 
work and will be reported in more detail 
in future publications. 
 Further optimisation of the core fusion 
process is underway. A number of 
artificial intelligence methods are 
suitable, but a particular interest is the 
ability to deal with missing data items. 
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Figure 1. Varying Criticality in a Production Line 
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Figure 2. CBC Data Retrieval Architecture 
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Figure 3: The JDL data fusion framework [27] 
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 Figure 4. The CBC Process 
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Tables: 
 
Table 1: NORSOK Criticality Classification Table [13] 
 
Class Health, Safety & Environment Production Cost (exclusive 
production loss) 
High Potential for serious personal injuries. 
Render safety critical systems inoperable. 
Potential for fire in classified areas. 
Potential for large pollution. 
Stop in production/ 
significant reduced rate of 
production exceeding X 
(specify duration) within a 
defined time period. 
Substantial cost – 
exceeding Y NOK 
(specify cost limit). 
Medium Potential for injuries requiring medical 
treatment. 
Limited effect on safety systems. 
No potential for fire in classified area. 
Potential for moderate pollution. 
Brief stop in 
production/reduced rate 
lasting less than X hours 
(specify duration) within a 
defined period of time. 
Moderate cost between Z-
Y NOK (specify cost 
limits). 
Low No potential for injuries. 
No potential for fire or effect on safety 
systems. 
No potential for pollution. 
No effect on production 
within a defined period of 
time. 
Insignificant cost less than 
Z NOK (specify cost 
limit). 
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Table 2: Top ranking CBC value summary 
 
 
Rank Asset 
Probability of 
Failure 
Consequence of 
Failure CBC Value 
1 001609 VIB 0.53 £56,361 £29,871 
2 001601 FRE 0.96 £25,989 £24,949 
3 001359 VIB 0.46 £45,017 £20,708 
4 001501 FRY 0.96 £19,904 £19,108 
5 001334 VIB 0.61 £28,257 £17,236 
6 001412 PP 0.51 £33,322 £16,994 
7 001416 DRY 0.78 £21,318 £16,628 
8 001353 ADR 0.92 £15,468 £14,231 
Page 24 of 26 
Table 3: Calculating CBC Values 
 
   
 
Day
Production 
Line
Equipment 
Code Product Code Production Capital Quality
Safety & 
Environment
Customer 
Satisfaction
Total 
Consequences £
Probability 
of Failure %
CBC 
Value
Mon 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Mon 2 001024 GME OVEN C/C 900 200 50 0 100 1250 5 62.5
Tue 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Tue 2 001024 GME OVEN C/C 900 200 50 0 100 1250 5 62.5
Wed 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Wed 2 001024 GME OVEN C/C 900 200 50 0 100 1250 5 62.5
Thu 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Thu 2 001024 GME STK C/C 1200 200 100 0 200 1700 5 85
Fri 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Fri 2 001024 GME STK C/C 1200 200 100 0 200 1700 5 85
Sat 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Sat 2 001024 GME STK C/C 1200 200 100 0 200 1700 5 85
Consequence Criteria
Day
Production 
Line
Equipment 
Code Product Code Production Capital Quality
Safety & 
Environment
Customer 
Satisfaction
Total 
Consequences £
Probability 
of Failure %
CBC 
Value
Mon 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Mon 2 001024 GME OVEN C/C 900 200 50 0 100 1250 5 62.5
Tue 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Tue 2 001024 GME OVEN C/C 900 200 50 0 100 1250 5 62.5
Wed 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Wed 2 001024 GME OVEN C/C 900 200 50 0 100 1250 5 62.5
Thu 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Thu 2 001024 GME STK C/C 1200 200 100 0 200 1700 5 85
Fri 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Fri 2 001024 GME STK C/C 1200 200 100 0 200 1700 5 85
Sat 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Sat 2 001024 GME STK C/C 1200 200 100 0 200 1700 5 85
Consequence Criteria
Day
Production 
Line
Equipment 
Code Product Code Production Capital Quality
Safety & 
Environment
Customer 
Satisfaction
Total 
Consequences £
Probability 
of Failure %
CBC 
Value
Mon 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Mon 2 001024 GME OVEN C/C 900 200 50 0 100 1250 5 62.5
Tue 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Tue 2 001024 GME OVEN C/C 900 200 50 0 100 1250 5 62.5
Wed 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Wed 2 001024 GME OVEN C/C 900 200 50 0 100 1250 5 62.5
Thu 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Thu 2 001024 GME STK C/C 1200 200 100 0 200 1700 5 85
Fri 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Fri 2 001024 GME STK C/C 1200 200 100 0 200 1700 5 85
Sat 1 001023 FAM OVEN STD 1000 300 100 0 50 1450 5 72.5
Sat 2 001024 GME STK C/C 1200 200 100 0 200 1700 5 85
Consequence Criteria
A 
C 
B 
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Table 4: Changing CBC values with schedule 
 
 
  
Probability of 
Failure 
Potential 
Consequence CBC Value  
Asset 
Schedule 
A 
Schedule 
B 
Schedule 
A 
Schedule 
B 
Schedule 
A 
Schedule 
B % Variation 
001205 PP 0.12 0.15 £12,392 £12,134 £1,487 £1,820 22.4 
001211 CUT 0.19 0.08 £8,170 £8,019 £1,552 £641 -58.7 
001208 CUT 0.31 0.13 £9,866 £9,674 £3,058 £1,257 -58.9 
001209 CUT 0.32 0.13 £8,558 £8,397 £2,738 £1,091 -60.1 
001207 VIB 0.08 0.03 £6,862 £6,741 £549 £202 -63.2 
001206 VIB 0.03 0.01 £6,155 £6,048 £184 £60 -67.3 
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Table 5: Effect on an individual CBC values with schedule 
 
 
Production Schedule A     
Priority Asset CBC Value     
32 001328 RNR £4,256  Production Schedule B 
33 001101 CON £4,169  Priority Asset CBC Value 
34 001214 PP £4,078  52 001226 PP £1,782 
35 001424 CON £3,891  53 001378 PP £1,753 
36 001519 VIB £3,856  54 001901 PP £1,575 
    55 001214 PP £1,496 
    56 001344 VIB £1,310 
 
